JEAN PISANI-FERRY
|
Accueil
/ Nouveau ! New !
Report - Coming of Age, Report on the euro areaA Bruegel report by Jean Pisani-Ferry, Philippe Aghion, Alan Ahearne, Marek Belka, Jürgen von Hagen, Lars Heikensten and André Sapir] Read the introduction “We must, indeed, all hang together, or most assuredly we shall all hang separately.” Benjamin Franklin, 1776 By many standards, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is a major success. The transition to the new currency was remarkably smooth. The euro area has enjoyed remarkable price stability. After several disappointing years of economic performance between 2001 and 2005, growth picked up in 2006. Economic integration among the countries participating in the single currency has progressed. In spite of fashionable talk about a break-up of the euro area, the reality is that there are many countries wishing to join and none seeking to leave. Yet there are also dissatisfactions with the way the euro area functions, even among European leaders. In July 2007, the newly elected French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, instructed his Minister of Finance to “attain an economic government for Europe and especially for the euro area” and encouraged her not to hesitate to “propose institutional reforms for a better economic functioning of the euro area that would allow it to harvest growth, employment and prosperity.” French obsession with the governance of EMU may not be shared by other member countries, but statements by other euro area leaders also suggest a need for reforms. EU Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs Joaquín Almunia recently pointed out that “the Eurogroup has yet to assume the critical role that it could play in piloting the economic policies of the euro zone”, adding that “at times, the collegiality necessary for common action has been missing and member states have not always succeeded in coordinating their actions effectively or in ensuring that common interests take priority”. Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, who chairs the Eurogroup, expressed a similar view when he said that “construction work on the European single currency is not yet complete”. In his view, “the political arm, the economic policy arm of the European Economic and Monetary Union needs to be strengthened. European economic and currency policies are not just about money”. Nearly twenty years after the Delors Report provided the blueprint for EMU, fifteen years after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and almost ten years after the launch of the euro, EMU is still unfinished business. There is disagreement on which reforms are most desirable, the degree to which national economic policies should be coordinated, and the nature of the dialogue between ministers of finance and the monetary authority. Those disagreements do not preclude EMU from functioning well. In spite of some declarations to the contrary, no European leader really disputes the independence of the European Central Bank (ECB), the importance of price stability, or the need for fiscal discipline in a monetary union. Participating countries, however, seem to hold different views about the still unfulfilled promises of the euro while their governments have to deal with varying political environments and demands. Like partners in a couple, they live together but have their own lives to deal with and sometimes also separate dreams. Compromises have always been found between proponents of bare-bone EMU - who regard central bank independence, fiscal discipline and market integration as EMU’s three fundamental and sufficient tenets - proponents of federal EMU - who consider that the sustainability of monetary union requires some form of political union - and proponents of coordinated EMU - who also regard a bare-bone EMU as incomplete and unbalanced but rather advocate coordination instead of centralisation. However, our assessment is that there is a need now for clarity on what EMU is about and what it should become. We see three reasons for that :
A common thread throughout this report is the need for the policy framework of the euro area to be made clearer, more transparent and more accountable. We believe these reforms are essential for dealing with potential crises in the euro area. In our analysis and proposals, we distinguish three levels of reform. The first concerns individual policy players. Changes in the behaviour and strategies of the ECB and national government can be introduced while taking as given the overall rules, institutions and governance of EMU. We consider that much can be improved by acting at this level. The second level concerns reforms of EMU governance that may require changes in legislation but no Treaty amendments. In this category, we contemplate agreements to make better use of the existing legal framework or changes in secondary legislation - as was done in 2005 with the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact. Our assessment is that significant progress can be made at this level also. The focus here is specifically on the Eurogroup, because it is still a young institution whose role is not explicitly spelled out in the Treaty. The third level concerns Treaty amendments. We would have wished to avoid altogether making proposals of this type because we do not expect that Treaty revisions will be politically feasible in the near future. We have therefore exercised restraint and in most instances, the proposals we are making do not require Treaty changes, at least in the coming years. Nonetheless, though we take political constraints very seriously, we consider that the role of independent observers is to look beyond immediate obstacles and alert policymakers when there are strong reasons to do so. As developed in Chapter 7, our opinion is that overly legalistic interpretations of the Treaty provisions that fail to consider economic reasoning and facts undermine the very legitimacy of the common rule. In particular, we feel that the strict application of the existing jurisprudence risks discouraging the participation in the euro of several New Member States, and thereby contributing to creating a long-lasting divide within the EU. For those reasons, we do think that there is a need to reinterpret and even to revisit the provisions of the Treaty that hinder a more sensible approach to the enlargement of the euro area. While some readers will complain at the idea of revising the Treaty, others may say that our agenda is too limited. Indeed, we deliberately abstain from proposing more ambitious reforms involving, for example, an additional transfer of competence to the EU, a significant increase in the size of the EU budget, or a redefinition of the mandate of the ECB. What we propose are, in fact, modest reforms. Even the amendments to the Treaty that we consider would not change its architecture or alter the balance between institutions. At this stage, we see no reason to envisage a radical overhaul of EMU. It has been reasonably successful so far and the focus for now should remain on learning and adjusting. But can a modest agenda change anything beyond rhetoric and bureaucratic procedures ? Our view is that incremental changes can have significant effects if they are inspired by experience and send the right signals. We do not exclude that the need for more radical moves will arise in the future. But today’s agenda is one of incrementalism, and we advocate giving it a chance to succeed. The report consists of ten chapters. We start in Chapter 1 by laying out the analytical framework on which we will base our discussions. Chapter 2 surveys the economic performance of the euro area. We then take up in turn in the chapters that follow six policy challenges of major importance for the future :
Chapter 9 looks at the governance of EMU and explores the extent to which changes in governance can help the euro area to face these policy challenges. The last chapter concludes and offers both policy-specific recommendations and proposals for reforms in the governance of EU institutions. Our governance recommendations are primarily addressed to the Eurogroup. With the euro approaching its tenth anniversary, it is time for an in-depth conversation on the common achievements and the way ahead. This report intends to be a contribution to this discussion. |
Dans la même rubrique :
|
The first is political. The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the French and Dutch voters in 2005 showed that dreams can clash with reality. While many reasons explain the voters’ attitudes, the distance between the image of the EU held by the political elites and its reality was certainly one. For EMU to be robust, citizens and governments in all participating countries need to know what it can do but also what it cannot do.
